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THE FIRM CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION AND SHAKY POLITICAL FUTURE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
Robert L. Glicksman
George Washington University Law School
CHAPTER EIGHT
in AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY (Christopher P. Banks ed.) (Routledge, 2018).
Environmental regulation in the United States is based on a cooperative federalism
foundation, which splits authority and responsibility for adopting, implementing, and enforcing
environmental protection standards between the federal and state governments. Early attacks in
court on this framework based on alleged limits on the federal government’s regulatory authority
failed. The Rehnquist Court’s recognition of limits on federal power under the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution 1 prompted a second wave of litigation seeking to impose constraints on
regulatory authority. These ventures, too, largely met a hostile judicial reception, at least as a
matter of constitutional law.
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts were more receptive to claims that federal regulation exceeded
statutory limits. It relied on the Constitution’s federalism structure to interpret narrowly the
intended scope of delegated federal regulatory power. This federalism dynamic surfaced most
prominently in cases construing the scope of regulatory jurisdiction under the federal Clean Water
Act (CWA), although the issue has also arisen under the Clean Air Act (CAA). More recently, the
Roberts Court recognized limits on federal power under the Spending Clause 2 that have the
potential to rein in federal environmental regulatory authority, albeit probably only at the margins.
On the other hand, the courts have recognized limits on state regulatory power under the
Supremacy3 and dormant Commerce Clauses.
The cooperative federalism structure built into the nation’s key environmental statutes 4 has largely
withstood the test of time, nearly fifty years after Congress kicked off the “environmental decade”
by adopting the CAA in 1970. Federal power to protect the environment has emerged relatively
unscathed. The Roberts Court may chip away at that power at the margins, through its
interpretations of the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, and the Tenth Amendment, 5 but
there is little indication that its current lineup is prepared to sharply constrain that power.
The environmental cooperative federalism venture that has served the nation so well is
nevertheless under attack. The Trump Administration is committed to sharply curtailing the scope
of federal environmental regulatory action as a matter of regulatory policy if not constitutional
1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
3
Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
4
Unless otherwise indicated, environmental statutes refer to those aimed at controlling pollution, not those
governing natural resource management. The latter implicate additional constitutional provisions, such as the
Property Clause, id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, which vests in Congress the power to adopt “needful Rules and Regulations”
for management of federally owned lands and resources.
5
Id. amend. X.
2

1
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law. The President and his top environmental appointees have professed a commitment to
federalism and protection of state sovereignty. This commitment seems disturbingly one-sided,
however. Although the Administration favors limitations on federal environmental regulatory
authority, its willingness to acknowledge and support state authority in this area appears to be
limited to state efforts to remove regulatory constraints and free up development. The
Administration has sought to slash federal funding that traditionally has allowed the states to play
a vital role in environmental cooperative federalism. Without it, the state role will necessarily
weaken. Further, the Administration has raised the prospect that it may support preemption of state
efforts to impose environmental constraints more stringent than federal regulation provides. This
asymmetric approach to state power fuels the perception that the Trump Administration’s devotion
to federalism is a thinly veiled mask for its fervor to ravage environmental protection regulatory
authority at both the federal and state levels.
This chapter begins by exploring the structure of and rationale for traditional cooperative
federalism. It then surveys the constitutional parameters of both federal and state environmental
regulatory power, emphasizing decisions by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts that bear on the
scope of each sovereign’s powers. The chapter concludes by analyzing the threats to environmental
cooperative federalism posed by the Trump Administration’s policies.
Traditional Environmental Cooperative Federalism
Cooperative federalism structures to achieve public policy goals are not confined to environmental
law and policy, as the chapters in this book attest. Environmental regulation, however, has been a
prominent arena in which Congress has relied on this model of governance. One member of the
Supreme Court has described cooperative federalism as an approach in which Congress invites
state and local authorities to make decisions subject to minimum federal standards instead of
preempting state authority in pursuit of a nationally uniform approach to problem solving. 6 In an
early environmental case, the Court described a “program of cooperative federalism” as one “that
allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer
their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular needs.” 7 In another case, it
used that term to describe instances in which, although “Congress has the authority to regulate
private activity under the Commerce Clause,” it has chosen “to offer States the choice of regulating
that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.”8
Cooperative federalism statutes thus anticipate “a partnership between the States and the Federal
Government, animated by a shared objective” and employ “permissible method[s] of encouraging
a State to conform to federal policy choices.” 9
In a nutshell, cooperative federalism in environmental regulation promotes “shared governmental
responsibilities for regulating private activity.” 10 Environmental statutes in the cooperative
federalism mold assign important roles to both levels of government. Under legislation such as the
6

City of Rancho Palo Verdes, California v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 127-28 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981).
8
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
9
Id.
10
1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 5:3 (2d ed. 2007)
(citing Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-Optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983)).
7
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CAA and CWA, the federal government, acting through authority delegated to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), is responsible for adopting standards that provide a minimum level of
protection throughout the country. 11 Under these laws, Congress has carved out a significant role
for the states to implement federal standards, subject to EPA’s approval. According to J.B. Ruhl,
environmental cooperative federalism statutes provide “opportunities for states to implement
national goals and standards through state-run programs that satisfy certain delegation criteria
regarding equivalency to the federal regime and adequacy of enforcement, in exchange for which
the federal government takes a back seat in the particular delegated state.” 12 States need not
respond to these invitations to craft policies that suit their economic and environmental needs, 13
but if they do not, EPA will step into the breach. 14
Under most federal environmental statutes, states may apply to EPA for authorization to administer
the permit programs that provide the principal means of applying emission standards or other
regulatory obligations (such as monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting) to individual regulated
entities. 15 Individual permits are typically subject to EPA veto. 16 A state choosing not to seek
permitting authority forfeits to EPA the power to administer the permit program for regulated
sources within the state. The environmental statutes typically divide authority to enforce statutory
or regulatory obligations between the federal and state governments, although the statutes differ
in the extent to which EPA must await state action before proceeding. 17 EPA retains exclusive
authority to enforce some federal standards. 18 Finally, cooperative federalism statutes tend to
include “savings clauses” that reserve state authority to adopt controls more stringent than those
adopted or required by EPA, 19 with some exceptions. 20 Thus, federal standards usually serve as
floors, not ceilings, on regulatory stringency. 21

11

E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (technology-based effluent limitations under the CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012)
(national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under the CAA).
12
J.B. Ruhl, Cooperative Federalism and the Endangered Species Act — Is There Hope for Something More?, in
STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE 325, 326 (Michael Allan Wolf
ed., 2005). See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410(a) (making states responsible for implementing NAAQS and
setting forth minimum requirements for acceptable state implementation plans); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)
(vesting in states the responsibility to adopt and implement water quality standards).
13
The CAA affords each state the “liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its
particular situation.” Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).
14
E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4), (d)(2) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (CAA).
15
E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. 6926 (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)); 42
U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f (CAA).
16
33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)-(c) (CAA).
17
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (CAA); see also United States v. Power Engineering Co., 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir.
2002); Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999) (addressing when the federal government may
“overfile” when dissatisfied with a state’s enforcement approach).
18
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (CAA). Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 666 (Occupational Safety and Health Act).
19
E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370(1) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (CAA).
20
E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (barring states from adopting labeling or packaging requirements different from those
required under federal pesticide statute); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543(a), 7545(c)(4), 7573 (CAA provisions barring adoption
of state standards to control motor vehicle emissions, specify permissible fuel additives, and control aircraft
emissions).
21
For a summary of cooperative federalism under the CWA, see United States Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S.
607, 633-34 (1992). See also Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 737-47 (2006) (describing
environmental statutes reflecting cooperative federalism).
3
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The rationale for shared federal and state environmental regulatory authority is well known. One
reason to vest standard-setting in the federal government is to assure that every American enjoys
a minimum level of protection against public health threats arising from polluting activities,
regardless of where they live. If individual states decide to enhance those protections, they are free
to do so by adopting more stringent standards. 22 Congress also carved out a predominant federal
role to address collective actions problems that experience showed that states were incapable of
tackling or unwilling to address. These include addressing transboundary negative externalities,
preventing a race to the bottom among the states, facilitating the pooling of resources capable of
effectively addressing environmental threats, providing uniformity in areas such as standardsetting for nationally marketed products, and restricting state or local authority to preclude the
local siting of socially important but environmentally undesirable uses. 23
Inviting states to play a significant role in the pursuit of environmental regulatory goals also
promotes important values. These include enhancing participatory democracy (because it is
usually easier for citizens to access state than federal officials), allowing states to craft regulatory
solutions that are responsive to local needs and conditions, taking advantage of the superior
expertise that state officials possess on the nature and extent of environmental problems affecting
their citizens, and allowing states to experiment with regulatory approaches to gain knowledge that
may ultimately benefit other states and federal regulators. 24 Vesting overlapping and concurrent
standard-setting and enforcement authority in both levels of government also creates a safety net
that protects against inertia by or capture of regulators. 25
Challenges to the Constitutionality of Cooperative Federalism
Early Constitutional Challenges
Regulated entities took little time to challenge the constitutionality of environmental cooperative
federalism statutes. The lower courts uniformly rejected those attacks, and the Supreme Court soon
followed suit. The Court issued its most important early decision in 1981 in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 26 rejecting claims by an association of companies
engaged in surface coal mining that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)27
violated a host of constitutional provisions, including the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
22

See Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 153233 (1995) (Cooperative federalism “holds the promise of allowing states continued primacy and flexibility in their
traditional realms of protecting health and welfare, while ensuring that protections for all citizens meet minimum
federal standards.”).
23
See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 N.W. U. L. REV. 579, 591-62 (2008).
24
See Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating
Allocations of Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 39-42 (2014) (summarizing benefits of
decentralized governance); see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (touting federalism’s potential to empower states to act as laboratories by “try[ing] novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country”); MARTHA DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL
GRANTS: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN MASSACHUSETTS 220 (1970) (noting that cooperative federalism “enables the
cooperating governments to benefit from one another’s special capacities while still preserving the value of political
pluralism”).
25
See Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 24, at 52.
26
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
27
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328.
4

Amendment. Like other environmental cooperative federalism statutes, SMCRA authorizes
federal performance standards, delegation of permitting authority to willing states, and shared
enforcement authority (between the states and the Department of the Interior). 28
The coal companies argued that SMCRA’s regulation of private lands within a single state
exceeded the scope of federal regulatory power under the Commerce Clause. The Court stressed
the deference courts must afford congressional findings that regulated activities affect interstate
commerce, and the “plenary” nature of the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce
Clause. 29 It held that Congress rationally determined that regulation of intrastate surface coal
mining is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the resulting adverse effects. It found
ample constitutional authority for Congress’s establishment of uniform national standards to
prevent destructive interstate competition among the states to attract coal mining, deeming this
effort a “traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause.” 30 In doing so, the
Court endorsed a series of lower court decisions that had “uniformly found the power conferred
by the Commerce Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air
or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State.” 31
The coal producers’ Tenth Amendment attacks on SMCRA fared no better. They argued that
constraints on surface mining on steep slopes impermissibly interfered with the traditional state
and local power to regulate land use. The Court disagreed, reasoning that these constraints applied
only to private coal mining operations. SMCRA did not compel states to enforce the standards, to
expend any state funds, or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any way; the federal
government would take on the burden of implementation and enforcement in any state choosing
not to participate. As a result, SMCRA did not “commandeer” state legislative processes “by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.” 32 Again, the Court
approvingly cited lower court decisions upholding other environmental statutes in the face of Tenth
Amendment challenges. 33 It ruled that Congress does not invade powers reserved to the states
under the Tenth Amendment “simply because it exercises its authority under the Commerce Clause
in a manner that displaces the States’ exercise of their police powers.” 34 The next year, the Court
used similar reasoning to turn aside Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment challenges to
another cooperative federalism statute involving energy regulation. 35
A decade later, the Court identified an environmental statutory provision that ran afoul of the
Constitution’s federalism provisions. In New York v. United States, 36 it upheld surcharges imposed
28

Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268-72.
Id. at 276.
30
Id. at 281-82.
31
Among the cases cited were United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1979) (CWA); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540
F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (CAA); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (CAA); United
States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) (CWA); S. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646
(1st Cir. 1974) (CAA).
32
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
33
Id. (citing Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977) (CAA); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (CAA)).
34
Id. at 291. In another case decided the same day, the Court held that SMCRA’s provisions protecting prime
farmland violated neither the Commerce Clause nor the Tenth Amendment. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
35
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 (1982).
36
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
29

5

on states for disposal of radioactive waste generated without complying with Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1985 requirements to participate in efforts to site and build new
disposal facilities. It also ruled that conditioning the receipt of federal funds on compliance with
the statute’s schedule for constructing, or participating in an interstate compact that constructed, a
disposal site was a valid exercise of the Spending Clause.
The Court concluded, however, that the Act’s provisions forcing states not complying with the
requirements for helping to site new disposal facilities to take title to waste generated within their
borders violated the Tenth Amendment. Those provisions purportedly offered the states the
“choice” of accepting ownership of low-level waste or regulating disposal according to federal
instructions. The Court reasoned, however, that:
A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at
all. Either way, “the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,” an outcome that has
never been understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the
Constitution.37
New York v. United States established that Congress may not offer a state “no option other than
that of implementing [federal] legislation. . . .” 38 Congress has not replicated the 1985 Act’s “take
title” provisions in other federal statutes, however, and most efforts to extend that precedent to
other pollution control statutes failed. 39 Despite New York, little environmental legislation has been
vulnerable to Tenth Amendment challenge.
A 2015 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is illustrative. 40 The court
rebuffed claims by a group of states and industrial entities that CAA provisions allowing EPA to
override state determinations on the appropriate status of air quality control regions (attainment,
nonattainment, or unclassifiable) amounted to unconstitutional commandeering. The statute does
not compel states to implement a federal regulatory program. Instead, it authorizes EPA “to
promulgate and administer a federal implementation plan of its own if the State fails to submit an
adequate state implementation plan [SIP],” imposing the “full regulatory burden” on the federal
government if a state chooses not to submit a SIP. 41 In another CAA case, the same court
interpreted Supreme Court precedents as “repeatedly affirm[ing] the constitutionality of federal

37

Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
Id. at 177.
39
See, e.g., Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting Tenth Amendment attack on the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA)); City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding conditions on
EPA-issued stormwater discharge permits under the CWA); Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 319 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 2003)
(same); Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting challenge to CAA provisions authorizing EPA to
impose sanctions on states with inadequate permit programs); cf. Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th
Cir. 2002) (holding that agency’s refusal to permit state to vaccinate elk on national wildlife refuge to prevent
brucellosis did not violate Tenth Amendment). On rare occasions, Tenth Amendment challenges succeeded. See
ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that SDWA requirement that states establish remedial
plans to remove lead-contamination from school and day-care center drinking water facilities impermissibly sought
to control state legislative processes).
40
Mississippi Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
41
Id. at 175.
38
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statutes that allow States to administer federal programs but provide for direct federal
administration if a State chooses not to administer it.” 42
More Recent Constitutional Attacks
Twenty-five years after Congress enacted the CAA, the constitutionality of federal environmental
legislation seemed secure. With few exceptions, the courts at all levels had turned aside federalismbased challenges to cooperative federalism regimes. In 1995, however, for the first time in decades,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez 43 concluded that a federal statute exceeded Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority. Five years later, the Court invalidated another statute on the same
ground in United States v. Morrison. 44
Neither of these decisions involved an environmental statute. They nevertheless triggered a new
round of constitutional challenges to federal environmental legislation. Those efforts were no more
successful than the first wave of constitutional challenges had been, as the courts easily
distinguished Lopez and Morrison in finding solid grounding for the environmental statutes in the
Commerce Clause. The lower courts rejected claims that statutory provisions directed at
purportedly intrastate, local activities exceeded the scope of federal legislative authority under the
Commerce Clause. Among the statutes whose provisions survived these attacks were the SDWA,45
the CAA, 46 the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 47 and the CWA. 48
The Roberts Court fortified these decisions in its 2006 Raich decision, 49 in which it confirmed the
continuing validity of Wickard v. Filburn. 50 That 1942 case established that Congress may regulate
purely local activities that are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. Ten years later, the Roberts Court again ruled in Taylor v. United States
that Congress may regulate intrastate activities based on their “aggregate effects on interstate
commerce.” 51 Although neither of these cases addressed an environmental statute, the courts of
appeals relied on them in dismissing Commerce Clause challenges to regulation of intrastate
activities under statutes such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Every appellate court to
address the issue, some of which predated Raich, have held that the ESA’s taking prohibition does
not violate the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding differences in the rationales for concluding that
the ESA’s regulatory scheme has a substantial effect on interstate commerce even when the species
in question is found only in one state. 52 The ESA is not structured along the lines of a traditional
42

Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing New York and Hodel).
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
44
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act).
45
E.g., Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
46
E.g., United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002); Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus, 215 F.3d 61 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
47
E.g., United States v. Olin Corp. 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
48
E.g., United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 548 U.S.
901 (2006); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003).
49
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2006).
50
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
51
Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2079-80 (2016).
52
See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990 (10th
Cir. 2017); Markle Interests v. United States, 827 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc denied, 848 F.3d 635 (5th
43
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cooperative federalism statute. But the courts’ expansive interpretations in ESA cases of the
Commerce Clause’s application to intrastate economic activities with substantial aggregate effects
on interstate commerce are consistent with and have lent force to cases in which recent efforts to
convince courts that cooperative federalism statutes such as the CAA outstrip Congress’s
Commerce Clause power have met a frosty judicial reception. 53
Constitutional Avoidance
Although the Supreme Court has yet to conclude that an environmental statute is not supported by
the Commerce Clause, it has relied on constitutional limits on the power to regulate commerce to
interpret the scope of one of these statutes, the CWA, narrowly. The Court has long sought to avoid
unnecessarily addressing constitutional questions by adopting an interpretation of a statute
susceptible to multiple interpretations that eliminates the alleged constitutional deficiency. 54 In the
SWANCC case, 55 the Army Corps of Engineers, which jointly administers the CWA’s dredge and
fill permit program with EPA, required a permit for an abandoned sand and gravel pit containing
ponds that provided habitat for migratory birds. The Court found it unnecessary to address whether
that expansive application of the permit program ran afoul of the Commerce Clause. Instead, it
held that the Corps’ position conflicted with congressional intent, ruling that the CWA does not
extend to ponds that are not adjacent to open water.
The Court reasoned that “[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer
limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.” 56 It
added that its “prudential desire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues . . . is heightened
where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal
encroachment upon a traditional state power.” 57 In the absence of clear congressional intent to
cover the affected waters, the Court construed the statute narrowly “to avoid the significant
constitutional and federalism questions raised by [the Corps’] interpretation.” 58
A plurality of the Court relied on similar reasoning five years later in ruling in the Rapanos case
that the Corps improperly applied the dredge and fill permit program to wetlands based on their
indirect connections to tributaries of navigable waters. 59 Lacking a “clear and manifest” statement
from Congress, the plurality refused to conclude that Congress intended to “authorize an
unprecedented intrusion into traditional state authority” that “presses the envelope of constitutional
validity.” 60 It concluded that the program applies only to “relatively permanent, standing or

Cir. 2017); San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011); Alabama-Tombigbee
Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2007); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
53
See, e.g., Mississippi Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[T]here is no doubt
that the general regulatory scheme of the [CAA] has a substantial relation to interstate commerce.”).
54
RICHARD E. LEVY & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, STATUTORY ANALYSIS IN THE REGULATORY STATE 156-57 (2014)
(“Statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional issues or problems.”).
55
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (SWANCC).
56
Id. at 172.
57
Id. at 172-73.
58
Id. at 174.
59
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
60
Id. at 738.
8

flowing bodies of water,” not to channels in which water flows intermittently or ephemerally. 61
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion advancing a “significant nexus” test that the
lower courts have applied in most subsequent cases. In doing so, he asserted that his interpretation
of the statute avoided federalism concerns more effectively than the plurality’s approach. 62 Some
lower courts have relied on SWANCC or Rapanos to interpret federal environmental legislation
narrowly. 63
The Roberts Court and Spending and Commerce Clause Constraints on Federal Power
To date, the Roberts Court’s Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence has not
posed threats to the constitutionality of federal environmental statutes. Its interpretation of the
Spending Clause has the potential to do so, however. In 2012, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of portions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) in
the Sebelius case. 64 Five justices agreed that the federal tax power 65 supported the individual
mandate (which penalizes individuals refusing to purchase health insurance). Seven justices in two
separate opinions, however, concluded that that the ACA’s reliance on the Spending Clause to
withhold all federal Medicaid funding from states refusing to expand the program’s coverage for
the poor was constitutionally problematic. Chief Justice John Roberts characterized the threat to
pull back all Medicaid funding to uncooperative states as “a gun to the head” of the states and
“economic dragooning” that was impermissibly coercive. 66
The federal government has long provided financial assistance to help its state partners fulfill their
responsibilities under the environmental laws. Even before Congress adopted the CAA, it provided
financial and technical assistance to state regulators. 67 EPA provided first grants and then loans to
help municipalities meet their CWA water treatment responsibilities. 68 Sometimes, these funds
come with strings attached. Indeed, Congress has invoked its power to withdraw funding for other
activities if states fail to meet their environmental statutory obligations. The CAA, for example,
authorizes EPA to withhold federal funding for highway construction from states that do not
comply with their duties to improve air quality in areas not yet in compliance with the NAAQS.69
Before Sebelius, the Fourth Circuit held that this conditional funding mechanism is not
impermissibly coercive and that the conditions on receipt of highway funding are reasonably
related to the goal of reducing air pollution. Holding that the highway sanctions are a valid exercise
of the spending power, the court concluded that “Congress may ensure that funds it allocates are
not used to exacerbate the overall problem of air pollution.” 70
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Some scholars have argued that Sebelius may dictate a contrary conclusion, having clarified the
extent of (or imposed new constraints on) the exercise of the federal spending power. 71 The D.C.
Circuit, however, has dismissed the contention that the highway sanctions “impose such a steep
price that State officials effectively have no choice but to comply—in contravention of
[Sebelius].” 72 For several reasons, the court determined that the highway sanctions “are not nearly
as coercive as those in the ACA.” 73 First, a noncomplying state only risks forfeiture of funding for
transportation projects or grants applicable to its nonattainment areas rather than losing all federal
funding for an existing program. Second, states risk losing a much lower percentage of their federal
funding, either for highway construction or of their overall budget than in Sebelius. Third, although
imposition of a condition that did not restrict how the affected federal highway funds were to be
used might be problematic, the CAA redirects federal highway funds of noncomplying states to
Congress’ chosen programs, including those that would improve air quality. Fourth, the
problematic condition in Sebelius was new both because it had been recently enacted at the time
of the litigation and because conditions it imposed additional requirements with which states had
to comply to continue receiving preexisting federal funding. Neither the CAA’s requirement to
submit a SIP nor its highway funds sanction was a newly imposed condition. As a result, the states
were “not suddenly surprised by dramatically new conditions retroactively imposed after a long
period in which the State had accepted and relied upon unconditional federal funding—as was the
case in [Sebelius].” 74
Moreover, even if highway sanctions are newly problematic after Sebelius, few environmental
statutes are likely to be similarly affected. Jonathan Adler and Nathaniel Stewart, who have
suggested that the highway sanctions may violate the Spending Clause, conclude that “conditional
spending requirements under other federal environmental statutes appear to be far less vulnerable.
At present, most other federal environmental statutes simply impose conditions on how funding
for state-level environmental programs is to be spent or do no more than threaten conditional
preemption.” 75
Sebelius also has potential implications for Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Court’s
conclusion that the tax power supported the individual mandate precluded the need to address
whether the mandate is a legitimate exercise of Commerce Clause authority. Chief Justice Roberts
nevertheless weighed in, albeit arguably in dicta. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by three other
justices, also did so in a separate opinion. Neither opinion disputed that health care was imbued
with commerce or that individuals’ decisions not to obtain health insurance affected insurance
markets. They took issue, however, with the federal government’s attempt to compel someone not
actively in health care markets to buy insurance. Both opinions distinguished Wickard’s
aggregation of the local effects of an economic class of activities with substantial effects on
interstate commerce because the wheat farmers growing for home consumption in that case
engaged in affirmative conduct. Roberts concluded that the federal government cannot compel
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activity under the Commerce Clause “whenever enough [individuals] are not doing something the
Government would have them do.” 76
Putting aside that the Roberts and Scalia Commerce Clause analyses were unnecessary to the
decision given the agreement of a majority of the Court that the tax power supports the individual
mandate, this portion of Sebelius is not likely to provide fertile ground for future Commerce Clause
attacks on environmental regulation in most cases. Because almost all pollution and other
environmental harms result from affirmative economic activity, the compulsion to enter a market
involuntarily that troubled Roberts and Scalia is lacking. One context that might be analogous to
Sebelius involves forcing an individual to address hazardous substances under his or her land under
“passive migration” theories derived from federal hazardous waste statutes. Even then, however,
the landowner would have acted in acquiring the property (unless title passed by will or intestate
succession). It is unclear whether courts would find Commerce Clause concerns in such a case to
be cogent, but even if they do, the Commerce Clause reasoning in the Roberts and Scalia opinions
in Sebelius do not appear to pose a significant threat to the constitutionality of most federal
environmental statutory provisions.
Constraints on State Power
The flip side of the cooperative federalism coin is the exercise of state regulatory authority in the
pursuit of environmental protection goals. The primary constraints on state regulatory power in
this context are the Supremacy and dormant Commerce Clauses. The former provides that federal
law prevails over inconsistent state law. Preemption issues turn on whether Congress intended to
preserve or negate state law in particular circumstances. To the extent that the environmental
statutes explicitly preserve a role for the states (such as by allowing them to adopt standards more
stringent than federal law), preemption is not an issue, although questions concerning the proper
interpretation and application of statutory savings clauses and related provisions often arise. 77 The
Roberts Court concluded in 2011 that the CAA displaces federal common law public nuisance
remedies for harms caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 78 That case turned on separation
of powers, not federalism considerations. The Court left open whether state common law claims
survived. 79 The Sixth Circuit subsequently held that the CAA preserves claims under more
stringent state law, including state common law. 80
The dormant Commerce Clause restricts the ability of states and localities to control the flow of
interstate commerce or discriminate against out-of-state commerce. The Rehnquist Court
repeatedly struck down state and local attempts to prohibit the importation of solid waste generated
elsewhere or otherwise to control the flow of waste. 81 The Roberts Court distinguished those cases
76
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in upholding a flow control ordinance that forced waste haulers to send waste to facilities owned
and operated by a state-created public benefit corporation. 82 Finding that the ordinance did not
discriminate against interstate commerce, the Court upheld it because any incidental burden it may
have had on interstate commerce was outweighed by the public benefits conferred.
None of these cases directly implicated cooperative federalism statutes. Dormant Commerce
Clause issues may arise, however, in contexts in which challenged state laws can be regarded as
efforts to exercise preserved authority to advance federal environmental goals through more
stringent regulation. The Ninth Circuit ruled in 2013 that California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard,
which sought to reduce GHGs emitted in the production of transportation fuel, neither improperly
discriminated against interstate commerce nor violated the dormant Commerce Clause’s
prohibition on extraterritorial state regulation. 83 More recently, the Eighth Circuit struck down
Minnesota’s renewable portfolio standard (RPS), 84 which was also designed to combat climate
change. 85 The panel members disagreed on the rationale. One concluded that the standard qualified
as improper extraterritorial regulation because, to comply with it, integrated utilities must either
unplug from the electric grid or seek approval from Minnesota regulators of transactions that may
import electricity into Minnesota. The RPS improperly foisted on surrounding states Minnesota’s
policy of increasing the cost of electricity by restricting use of the most cost-efficient sources of
generating capacity. 86 A second judge concluded that the RPS was preempted because it conflicted
with the CAA’s cooperative federalism regime by limiting a source state’s authority to govern
emissions from sources within its own borders. The CAA creates other mechanisms for a state to
object to upwind state emissions. 87 That result purports to advance, not frustrate Congress’s
cooperative federalism goals, but it creates the potential to block states from supplementing weak
or nonexistent implementation of CAA provisions authorizing regulation of GHGs. 88
Sabotaging Environmental Cooperative Federalism through Abdication and Asymmetrical
Devolution
The discussion thus far indicates that, with few exceptions, cooperative federalism statutes stand
on strong constitutional footing. The principal current threats to environmental cooperative
federalism statutes and the protective goals they embody come from the executive branch, not the
courts. The environmental policy decisions advanced during the first six months of the Trump
Administration reflect an unprecedented retrenchment from the leadership role that EPA has
exercised in this arena, at Congress’s direction, for nearly 50 years. At the same time, despite
82
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paying lip service to federalism principles, the Administration seems intent on effectively disabling
the exercise of meaningful state regulatory power, if not ousting important components of that
authority entirely.
Early in the Trump Administration, EPA began repealing or delaying implementation of at least
thirty environmental regulations. This was the largest and fastest effort to eliminate regulatory
constraints that EPA had ever undertaken, and included delaying CAA rules restricting fugitive
methane emissions from the oil and gas industry 89 and preventing explosions and spills at chemical
plants. 90 Most prominently, EPA announced it would take steps to repeal an Obama EPA rule
defining the jurisdictional boundaries of various CWA programs (the so-called “waters of the
United States” or WOTUS rule) 91 and the Clean Power Plan (CPP), EPA’s effort to control GHG
emissions from existing electric generating units under the CAA. 92 EPA’s action on the WOTUS
rule came in response to an Executive Order directing EPA to “publish for notice and comment a
proposed rule rescinding or revising the rule, as appropriate and consistent with the law.”93
Retaining this Obama-era rule was apparently not an available option, regardless of the results of
EPA’s review. The announcement on the CPP came on the heels of President Donald Trump’s
issuance of an Executive Order promoting domestic energy production that mandated EPA review
of the CPP and other CAA regulations directed at GHG emissions. 94 The same Order immediately
repealed Obama Administration executive orders, memoranda, and reports relating to climate
change. 95
President Trump’s orders to EPA to review and, if appropriate, repeal both the WOTUS rule and
the CPP invoked federalism concerns. The Order directing EPA to review the CPP enunciated a
policy of “respecting the proper roles of the Congress and the States concerning these matters in
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our constitutional republic.” 96 Likewise, the Order directing EPA to review the WOTUS rule was
premised on a policy of “showing due regard for the roles of the Congress and the States under the
Constitution” in addressing water pollution, 97 and the Order itself was titled “Restoring the Rule
of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the ‘Waters of the United States’ Rule.”
EPA later issued a press release describing EPA Administrator E. Scott Pruitt’s “Back-to-Basics
agenda,” which included “returning power to the states” and “restoring states’ important role in
the regulation of local waters by reviewing the WOTUS . . . rule.” 98 Pruitt has repeated in other
forums that an important focus of his agenda is “cooperative federalism[: p]artnership,” 99 which
he labeled a “great concept” that had not yet proven effective. 100 He provided a different
explanation for the agency’s whirlwind approach to rescinding or delaying implementation of
these and other rules, however, proclaiming in an interview with Breitbart that “[w]e’re going to
roll it back, those things that were unlawful, we’re going to roll back those things that were an
overreach, we’re going to roll back the steps taken by the previous administration.” 101
Before being confirmed, Pruitt postulated that EPA “was never meant to be our nation’s front-line
environmental regulator.” 102 This demonstrably false statement flies in the face of voluminous
evidence that Congress intended EPA to play exactly that role and that demonstrates a willful
ignorance of the history of federal environmental regulation that is shocking for an EPA
Administrator. Before Congress enacted the foundational cooperative federalism statutes, the
federal government’s role was more confined than those laws would afford it. The states’ previous
failures to provide acceptable levels of environmental quality induced Congress to create a more
robust federal presence. Congress was also aware of the collective action problems, noted earlier,
that make a strong federal presence essential. As I have explained elsewhere, “Congress made
EPA the dominant partner because experience convinced it that the states lacked the will or the
capacity to achieve air quality protection goals.” 103 When Congress amended the CAA in 1977
and 1990, in the face of many states’ persistent noncompliance with the NAAQS, it rethought the
initial allocation of authority—and chose to rebalance the scales even more heavily in favor of
federal power. 104 Congress made similar judgments when enacting the other cooperative
96
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federalism statutes, 105 although at least one Supreme Court justice has grossly mischaracterized
the resulting cooperative federalism structures. 106 Nevertheless, as Attorney General of Oklahoma,
Pruitt filed lawsuits challenging EPA’s authority in the context in which collective action problems
may most clearly call for federal power—interstate pollution. 107
Pruitt’s EPA has made it clear that it will use federalism as a sword to justify federal regulatory
retrenchment. In its proposed rescission of the WOTUS rule, EPA cited § 101(b) of the CWA,
which enunciates a policy “to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use
(including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources.” 108 The
preamble to the proposal indicated that EPA and the Corps of Engineers would “consider[ ] the
relationship of the CWA objective and policies, and in particular, the meaning and importance of
section 101(b).” 109 EPA asserted that, in promulgating the rule in 2015, the agencies acknowledged
§ 101(b) but failed to discuss its importance in guiding their choices in defining the scope of the
CWA’s reach. The agencies would redress that deficiency by “more fully consider[ing]” § 101(b),
“including the extent to which states or tribes have protected or may protect waters that are not
subject to CWA jurisdiction.” 110 Some have suggested that the Trump Administration also may be
interested in putting the states in charge of remedy selection in hazardous substance cleanups under
CERCLA. 111 Congressional Republicans have introduced legislation that would require state
approval before federal agencies may list species as endangered or threatened under the ESA. 112
This withdrawal of the federal government from its historic role in protecting the environment is
troublesome. It might be less so if the Trump Administration were truly committed to state
empowerment and a sufficient number of states were willing and able to step into the breach
created by EPA’s significantly diminished role, but the Administration’s professed commitment
to the exercise of meaningful state regulatory power is belied by its actions.
As early as his confirmation hearings, Pruitt raised the possibility that he would revoke waivers
previously granted by EPA allowing California to enact tailpipe emission standards for GHGs
under the CAA that are more stringent than EPA’s, notwithstanding the statute’s general
preemption of state authority to enact or enforce emissions standards for new motor vehicles. 113
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Congress chose to allow California to adopt its own, more stringent emission standards because of
the severity of auto-related pollution in the southern part of the state resulting from its climate and
topography, and the state’s leadership role in controlling mobile source pollution. 114 California
began restricting vehicle emissions before federal agencies did so. According to California
regulators, EPA’s effort to block the state’s authority to enforce its current standards restricting
GHGs or to adopt future restrictions would eviscerate its ability to achieve its target of 40%
reductions in GHG emissions below 1990 levels by 2030. 115 The effects of revoking California’s
waiver would extend to other states, several of which have adopted standards equivalent to more
stringent California standards approved by EPA. 116
Pruitt announced in 2017 that he would not revoke California’s waiver, 117 declaring that
“[c]urrently, the waiver is not under review.” 118 But he had previously made it clear that the waiver
is “something that is granted on an annual basis.” 119 A refusal to renew the waiver at some time
down the road cannot be ruled out. Indeed, in litigation concerning the validity of California’s
standards EPA has stated its intention to review previously granted waivers for other air
pollutants. 120 This tepid defense of state leadership in combating mobile source pollution that
contributes to both climate change and increased ozone concentrations is a far cry from Pruitt’s
call for EPA to step down so that states can play a heightened role. 121 Further evidence of the
Administration’s willingness to preempt protective state initiatives is its threat to preempt state
RPSs. 122
The budgets the Administration presented to Congress demonstrate even more clearly its
questionable devotion to fostering vibrant state regulatory activity in an effort to shift the locus of
environmental policymaking authority. 123 The Administration proposed cutting EPA’s budget by
about 30% in fiscal year 2018. 124 It sought to reduce EPA staffing by about 20% to its lowest
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levels since the mid-1980s. 125 Trump’s budget called for reductions in EPA’s civil enforcement
program by 18%, its criminal enforcement program by 16.5%, and the forensics support for
enforcement by about 44%. The Administration justified these cuts by characterizing enforcement
as a “shared” federal-state effort. 126 According to President Barack Obama’s former Assistant
Administrator for the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, however, the cuts would
deal “a death blow to environmental enforcement.” 127
The dramatic cuts sought by the Administration would affect the states. Its budget proposal would
have slashed EPA’s categorical grants to the states by 45%. 128 It also would have cut state funding
beyond environmental cooperative federalism programs, including funding for coastal restoration,
hurricane protection, and wildland fire suppression, all of which tend to be dealt with locally.129
The budget sought to cut support for states to develop SIPs, the core mechanism for achieving the
NAAQS, by 24%, and for state and local air quality programs generally by 45%. 130 Funding for
favored state programs, including cleaning up the Great Lakes, Chesapeake Bay, and Puget Sound,
would have been eliminated entirely. Other targets included beach protection, nonpoint source
pollution, pollution prevention, radon, and underground storage tanks. 131 Perhaps most
transparently, the Administration indicated it wants to eliminate or reduce federal spending on
state actions that extend beyond EPA’s own (weakening) requirements. 132
Thus, devolution only goes so far. It does not encompass support for state policies and programs
that seek more rigorous environmental regulation than the Trump Administration sees fit to
administer. As the executive director of the National Association of Clean Air Agencies 133 put it,
“[w]hile the Trump Administration has been touting its commitment to ‘cooperative federalism,’
these proposed budget cuts belie that assertion.” 134 Similarly, the Executive Director of the
Environmental Council of the States reasoned that “[t]o have cooperative federalism, you have to
have financial support. There is a fairly significant disconnect going on.” 135
Congress made it clear that the Trump budget had no chance of being enacted. But money talks.
It is hard to interpret the Administration’s budget requests as anything other than a concerted effort
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to hollow out environmental regulation at both the federal and state levels. This destructive
endeavor is a far cry from the vibrant cooperative federalism venture which is the Administration’s
purported aim.
The Trump Administration’s aversion to a vibrant and environmentally protective version of
cooperative federalism does not sound the death knell of state participation in innovative and
effective environmental protection. Progressive states such as California continue to implement
programs that extend beyond federal regulatory requirements, including its efforts to reduce GHG
emissions 136 and ozone pollution. 137 States and localities took steps to join the 2015 Paris climate
accord after President Trump repudiated it. 138 The Attorney Generals of states that value rather
than disdain environmental protection have begun challenging Trump Administration efforts,
sometimes in concert with one another, to roll back, delay implementation of, or otherwise weaken
federal regulatory initiatives undertaken under or demanded by the cooperative federalism
statutes. 139 These efforts are being undertaken without the support of and sometimes in direct
opposition to federal officials, and state funding cuts would hamper their ability to fill federal
regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
The environmental cooperative federalism statutes have survived decades of judicial challenges in
which litigants have asserted, with little success, that these statutes contravene constitutional limits
on federal or state regulatory authority. Changes in the future composition of the Supreme Court
may impose more significant constraints on cooperative federalism ventures than the Court has
been willing to recognize to date. In the meantime, the constitutional underpinnings of these
environmental statutes, which carve out distinctive roles for EPA and the states, seem solid.
Environmental cooperative federalism, however, is facing perhaps its stiffest test in the form of
the Trump Administration’s efforts to reshape environmental law, both in substance and structure.
This time, the threat comes from within. The extent to which environmental cooperative federalism
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is capable of emerging unscathed from this assault is not yet clear. 140 The fate of nearly fifty years
of environmental protection advances hangs in the balance.
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